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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 This matter is before the court on an appeal by 
taxpayers in a suit involving claims for income tax adjustments 
and refunds.  The facts are not in dispute, and we set them forth 
as found by the district court.  Appellant David A. Koss, a 
member of the Pennsylvania bar since 1957, agreed with a client 
in 1971 to perform legal services in exchange for stock in Video 
Systems Corp.  In 1973, a dispute between Koss and his client 
over the number of shares to be paid Koss escalated into a court 
action.  In January 1974, the parties reached a settlement in 
which Koss would receive 22,000 shares on February 1, 1974, as 
well as the proceeds from the intended sale of an additional 
20,000 shares.  The 22,000 shares were not registered under the 
Securities Act of 1933, so their sale to the public was 
restricted. 
 In their 1974 federal income tax return, Koss and his 
wife, appellant Freya Koss, reported the value of the 22,000 
shares as $4,400 of gross ordinary income.  In 1977, the Internal 
Revenue Service started examining the Kosses' 1974 return. 
However, in 1977 the shares became worthless.  While this 
examination was pending, the Kosses filed a federal income tax 
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return for 1977 which did not claim a loss sustained on the 
22,000 shares of Video Systems stock received in 1974. 
 On December 5, 1980, the IRS asserted an income tax 
deficiency of $48,788.05 against the Kosses for 1974.1  The 
deficiency was attributable to the IRS placing the fair market 
value of the 22,000 shares of Video Systems stock at $110,000 
rather than $4,400.  On February 28, 1981, the Kosses timely 
petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of 
this asserted deficiency.  Ultimately, the Tax Court upheld the 
IRS and determined that the Kosses owed $48,788.05.  We affirmed 
the decision of the Tax Court.  Koss v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 882 (1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 962 (3d Cir. 1990).  The Tax 
Court decision became final on September 23, 1990, when the time 
for petitioning for certiorari expired. 
 On August 3, 1991, the Kosses filed an amended tax 
return for 1977 indicating that the 22,000 shares of Video 
Systems stock had become worthless.  Accordingly, they requested 
an adjustment of their income tax liability and a refund of the 
$899.07 in tax they paid for that year.  On that same date, the 
Kosses also filed an amended tax return for 1974 that requested 
an adjustment based on the carryback of the net operating loss 
incurred in 1977 due to the worthlessness of the 22,000 shares. 
At that time, they paid a tax of $2,148.41 for 1974, which they 
computed was the amount due after application of the carryback 
                     
1We take this figure from the Tax Court opinion.  In its brief 
the government indicates the figure was $47,788.05. 
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loss.  The IRS disallowed the requested adjustments on November 
21, 1993. 
 On December 27, 1993, the Kosses brought this action 
for recovery of the $899.07 and for allowance of the requested 
adjustments on their 1974 return.  The district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the government on December 21, 1994. 
It reasoned that the complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations in 26 U.S.C. § 6511 and could not be salvaged by the 
mitigation sections at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14.  The Kosses then 
timely appealed, asserting that the district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (civil action against 
United States for recovery of tax allegedly erroneously or 
illegally assessed or collected) and 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (civil 
action for refund).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1291 and exercise plenary review.  See Pleasant Summit Land 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 901, 110 S.Ct. 260 (1989). 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Limitations on Jurisdiction 
 The United States "is immune from suit, save as it 
consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued 
in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the 
suit."  United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 
953 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 
61 S.Ct. 767, 769 (1941)).  Thus, although 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) 
provides that the district court has jurisdiction over "[a]ny 
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civil action against the United States for the recovery of any 
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or 
illegally assessed or collected . . . under the internal-revenue 
laws," other statutory provisions placing requirements or 
restrictions on such actions limit and determine the scope of 
this grant of jurisdiction.  United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 
601, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 1364 (1990). 
 The statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C. § 6511 is one 
such limitation on jurisdiction.  The basic rule is as follows: 
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment 
of any tax imposed by this title in respect 
of which tax the taxpayer is required to file 
a return shall be filed by the taxpayer 
within 3 years from the time the return was 
filed or 2 years from the time the tax was 
paid, whichever of such periods expires the 
later . . . . 
26 U.S.C. § 6511(a).  Where, however, the claim for credit or 
refund relates to an overpayment of income tax on account of bad 
debts or worthless securities, the limitations period is "7 years 
from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the 
year with respect to which the claim is made."  26 U.S.C. 
§6511(d)(1).  A claim for credit or refund of tax brought after 
the expiration of the limitations period is outside the district 
court's jurisdiction.  United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 602, 
110 S.Ct. at 1365. 
 In this case, the Kosses seek an adjustment of their 
1977 income tax liability and a refund of $899.07 from the tax 
they paid upon filing their 1977 income tax return on or before 
April 15, 1978.  Under section 6511(d)(1), the applicable statute 
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of limitations expired seven years after that date, or April 15, 
1985.  Consequently, the refund claim filed on August 3, 1991, is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
 Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), a taxpayer 
filing suit for an income tax refund must pay the full amount of 
the tax prior to filing the suit.  Thus, in Flora v. United 
States, the Supreme Court concluded that "§ 1346(a)(1), correctly 
construed, requires full payment of the assessment before an 
income tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District 
Court."  362 U.S. 145, 177, 80 S.Ct. 630, 647 (1960); see also 
Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1158 (3d Cir. 1971).  This 
requirement defeats the Kosses' claim for an adjustment to their 
1974 income tax liability.  As described above, the IRS asserted 
a deficiency of $48,788.05 against them for 1974.  The Kosses 
filed a petition with the Tax Court for a determination, which 
determination became final on September 23, 1990.  Although the 
Kosses have not paid the deficiency of $48,788.05, they seek to 
adjust their tax liability for 1974 based on (1) the IRS's 
determination that the 22,000 shares were worth $110,000 in 1974; 
(2) the loss of that amount in 1977 due to the worthlessness of 
the stock; and (3) the carryback of the net operating loss 
resulting from the loss incurred in 1977.  The Kosses have 
labelled their claim as one for an adjustment of their 1974 tax 
liability, but the net effect they seek is a credit to be applied 
to the outstanding deficiency.  Because they have not paid the 
full amount of the asserted deficiency, however, their claim 
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cannot be brought in the district court under 28 U.S.C. 
§1346(a)(1). 
 As the government correctly points out, this is a no-
win argument for the Kosses.  If they did not pay the full 
assessment for the year 1974, they could not bring the claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  If they did pay it, their current 
claim would still be barred by the statute of limitations found 
in section 6511(d)(2)(A): 
If the claim for credit or refund relates to 
an overpayment attributable to a net 
operating loss carryback . . . , in lieu of 
the 3-year period of limitation prescribed in 
subsection (a), the period shall be that 
period which ends 3 years after the time 
prescribed by law for filing the return 
(including extensions thereof) for the 
taxable year of the net operating loss . . . 
which results in such carryback . . . .   
26 U.S.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The net operating 
loss is alleged to have occurred in 1977; the tax return for that 
year was required to be filed by April 15, 1978.  The Kosses 
filed their 1977 return on or before April 15, 1978, and thus 
they had three years, or until April 15, 1981, to bring this 
claim to adjust their 1974 tax liability.  Since they did not 
bring the claim until 1991, it is time-barred. 
 Moreover, the government argues correctly that the 
claim to adjust the 1974 tax liability is also barred by section 
6512(a), which provides: 
Effect of petition to Tax Court. -- If the 
Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice 
of deficiency under section 6212(a) (relating 
to deficiencies of income, estate, gift, and 
certain excise taxes) and if the taxpayer 
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files a petition with the Tax Court within 
the time prescribed in section 6213(a)  
. . . , no credit or refund of income tax for 
the same taxable year . . . in respect of 
which the Secretary has determined the 
deficiency shall be allowed or made and no 
suit by the taxpayer for the recovery of any 
part of the tax shall be instituted in any 
court . . . . 
26 U.S.C. § 6512(a).  Under this section, filing a petition to 
the Tax Court to challenge an asserted deficiency bars the 
taxpayer from bringing a suit in any other court for the recovery 
of any part of the tax for that taxable year.  See, e.g., 
Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United States, 862 F.2d 846, 848 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (section 6512(a) bars any action for taxes for same 
taxable year in respect of which taxpayer petitioned Tax Court); 
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 792 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 
1986) (district court has no jurisdiction over redetermination of 
estate tax liability previously established in Tax Court), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 948 (1987); Bowser v. 
Commissioner, 559 F.2d 1207, No. 76-1031, 1977 WL 25925, at *1 
(3d Cir. June 10, 1977) ("§ 6512(a) operates as a limitation on 
the general jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1346[.]"); Elbert 
v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1947) ("It is not the 
decision which the Tax Court makes but the fact that the taxpayer 
has resorted to that court which ends his opportunity to litigate 
in the District Court his tax liability for the year in 
question."); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 606, 110 
S.Ct. at 1367 (noting that taxpayer's petition in Tax Court on 
income tax liability precluded relitigation of same in district 
court). 
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 When the IRS notified them of the deficiency for 1974, 
the Kosses did not pay the tax and seek a refund in the district 
court.  Rather, they petitioned the Tax Court for a determination 
which ultimately became final against them.  Consequently, they 
are barred by section 6512(a) from bringing any suit in any court 
to litigate their tax liability for 1974.  We realize that when 
the Video Systems stock became worthless in 1977, the Kosses 
believed that the shares had been worth only $4,400 rather than 
$110,000 in 1974, and that they believe that they therefore could 
not have asserted a $110,000 loss in the Tax Court. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the Kosses are advancing issues that were not 
presented to the Tax Court and perhaps could not have been 
considered by that court cannot change our conclusion. "[T]he Tax 
Court's jurisdiction, once it attaches, extends to the entire 
subject of the correct tax for the particular year." Erickson v. 
United States, 309 F.2d 760, 767 (Cl. Ct. 1962). Even in cases 
where the issues raised by taxpayers in the district court could 
not have been litigated in the Tax Court because they arose from 
facts occurring after the Tax Court's decision, courts regularly 
hold that the petition to the Tax Court bars a subsequent suit in 
the district court.  See, e.g., Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United 
States, 862 F.2d at 849; United States v. Wolf, 238 F.2d 447, 451 
(9th Cir. 1956); Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d at 424.  
B.  Mitigation of Effects of Limitations 
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 In certain instances, the effects of the statute of 
limitations may be mitigated.2  26 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14.  While 
these mitigation provisions are remedial and should be given a 
liberal interpretation, the party invoking them has the burden of 
showing that mitigation is permitted.  O'Brien v. United States, 
766 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Olin Mathieson Chem. 
Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1959)). 
 Section 1311(a) allows for the correction of certain 
types of errors: 
General rule. -- If a determination (as 
defined in section 1313) is described in one 
or more of the paragraphs of section 1312 
and, on the date of the determination, 
correction of the effect of the error 
referred to in the applicable paragraph of 
section 1312 is prevented by the operation of 
any law or rule of law, other than this part 
and other than section 7122 (relating to 
compromises), then the effect of the error 
shall be corrected by an adjustment made in 
the amount and in the manner specified in 
section 1314. 
26 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  Section 1313 defines "determination" to 
include "a decision by the Tax Court or a judgment, decree, or 
other order by any court of competent jurisdiction, which has 
become final."  26 U.S.C. § 1313.  The Kosses claim the Tax 
Court's decision to value the shares at $110,000 and the 1974 tax 
                     
2Though this point is by no means clear, we will assume without 
deciding that, notwithstanding the Kosses' failure to pay the 
1974 tax assessment in full, and notwithstanding their 
institution of the Tax Court proceeding for that year, if the 
mitigation provisions were by their terms applicable here, we 
could apply them to grant the Kosses relief.  In this regard, we 
note that the government's brief does not contend expressly that 
these procedural hurdles render the mitigation provisions 
inapplicable for 1974. 
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deficiency at $48,788.05 falls within this definition of 
"determination." 
 The Kosses contend that this determination further is 
described in section 1312(7)(A), which provides in relevant part: 
(A) General rule. -- The determination 
determines the basis of property, and in 
respect of any transaction on which such 
basis depends, or in respect of any 
transaction which was erroneously treated as 
affecting such basis, there occurred, with 
respect to a taxpayer described in 
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, any of 
the errors described in subparagraph (C) of 
this paragraph. 
26 U.S.C. § 1312(7)(A).  They further contend that the 
determination resulted in an error described in section 
1312(7)(C)(ii): 
(C) Prior erroneous treatment. -- With 
respect to a taxpayer described in 
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph -- 
  . . . . 
 (ii) there was an erroneous recognition, 
or nonrecognition, of gain or loss . . . . 
26 U.S.C. § 1312(7)(c)(ii).  In particular, the Kosses argue that 
there was an erroneous nonrecognition of the loss of $110,000 on 
their 1977 return, and that this error was not rectifiable at the 
time of the determination due to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations in section 6511.  Br. at 11-12. 
 The problem with this argument is that the error they 
specify was not due to the determination by the Tax Court of the 
1974 basis of the shares.  The nonrecognition in the 1977 return 
of the loss of the value of the shares was caused by the Kosses' 
failure to declare that they had any loss at all.  Thus, if they 
had declared in their 1977 return the loss of the value of 
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securities (which they claimed to be worth $4,400), then the Tax 
Court's determination would have caused an error of 
nonrecognition of a loss of $110,000 less $4,400, or $105,600. In 
any event, this causal factor cannot help the Kosses, because 
section 1312(7)(A) does not describe an error that is caused by 
or is the result of a determination.  O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1043. 
 Section 1312(7)(A) requires that the error described in 
subparagraph (C) occur, not as a result of the determination, but 
"in respect of any transaction on which such basis depends, or in 
respect of any transaction which was erroneously treated as 
affecting such basis."  A "transaction on which . . . basis 
depends" refers to "'the transaction in which the property was 
acquired, and the basis of the property at the time of 
disposition can be said to depend on [or is determined by] such 
transaction.'"  O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1043 n.5 (quoting United 
States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508, 517 (9th Cir. 1961)). 
 In O'Brien, 766 F.2d 1038, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit faced similar issues.  There, the taxpayer 
received shares of stock as a gift made in contemplation of 
death.  The relevant estate filed an estate tax return in 1974 
that valued the stock at about $215 per share.  The IRS 
challenged this valuation, and the matter was litigated in the 
Tax Court.  In 1975, the corporation at issue was liquidated, and 
the taxpayer reported the resulting capital gain on his 1975 
federal income tax return predicated on a basis of $215 per 
share.  The IRS did not dispute this 1975 return.  In 1980, the 
Tax Court finally entered a stipulated order setting the value of 
13 
the stock at about $280 per share at the time of the original 
owner's death.  In 1981, the taxpayer filed a refund claim for 
the overpayment of capital gains tax that was based on the lower 
basis figure, but the IRS denied the claim as untimely because 
more than three years had passed since the filing of the 1975 
return and more than two years had passed since the taxpayer had 
paid the tax which he sought refunded.  The taxpayer then filed a 
refund action in the district court and attempted to invoke the 
mitigation provisions involved in this case to avoid the statute 
of limitations bar.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that the mitigation provisions did not apply.  Specifically, 
the court held that the error of overpayment of capital gains tax 
was not "in respect of" the transaction, which was the transfer 
of the shares by the taxpayer's father and his subsequent death. 
Id. at 1043.  The court explained that this error occurred "'in 
respect of' the 1975 liquidation transaction and did not occur 
'in respect of' the [father's] transfer and subsequent death." 
Id. 
 As the government points out, the error alleged here, 
the nonrecognition of loss resulting from the worthlessness of 
the stock in 1977, similarly was not "in respect of any 
transaction on which such basis depends."  26 U.S.C. §1312(7)(A).  
The basis of the shares in the determination depended on the 
transaction in which David Koss acquired them in 1974.  The basis 
of the shares did not depend on their becoming worthless in 1977.  
Thus, the error in failing to recognize the shares' loss in value 
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did not occur "in respect of" their acquisition by David Koss in 
1974. 
 The Kosses further argue that because the shares 
eventually became worthless, the basis of the shares also had to 
be adjusted downward according to 26 U.S.C. § 1016(a)(1) and, 
therefore, the loss of the value of the shares in 1977 was a 
transaction on which the basis of the property depended.  Reply 
Br. at 7.  We cannot accept this analysis, however, because it 
ignores the first part of section 1312(7)(A): 
The determination determines the basis of 
property, and in respect of any transaction 
on which such basis depends, . . . there 
occurred . . . any of the errors . . . .   
26 U.S.C. § 1312(7)(A) (emphasis added).  The determination did 
not purport to ascertain the basis of the shares for all time. It 
only sought to determine the basis of the shares in 1974 so that 
the Kosses' taxable income and tax liability for 1974 could be 
determined.  Clearly, the basis of the shares in 1974 depends 
only on their value at the acquisition by the Kosses and not on 
the shares' subsequent loss in value in 1977.  In addition, while 
the Kosses allege that they "reduced the basis of the Video stock 
in 1977 by $4,400," reply br. at 7, as required by Section 
1016(a)(1), it is not clear that they did so, for they did not 
deduct this loss on the 1977 return, and section 1016(a)(1) 
refers only to a reduction in basis for losses "for which 
deductions have been taken by the taxpayer in determining taxable 
income for the taxable year or prior taxable years."  26 U.S.C. 
§1016(a)(1). 
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 Finally, even if the Kosses' claim could satisfy the 
general rule of section 1311(a), they fail to meet the additional 
"[c]onditions necessary for adjustment" listed in section 
1311(b).  Only the condition in section 1311(b)(1) is arguably 
applicable in this case: 
(1) Maintenance of an inconsistent position. 
-- Except in cases described in paragraphs 
(3)(B) and (4) of section 1312, an adjustment 
shall be made under this part only if -- 
 
 (A) in case the amount of the adjustment 
would be credited or refunded in the same 
manner as an overpayment under section 1314, 
there is adopted in the determination a 
position maintained by the Secretary, or 
 
 (B) in case the amount of the adjustment 
would be assessed and collected in the same 
manner as a deficiency under section 1314, 
there is adopted in the determination a 
position maintained by the taxpayer with 
respect to whom the determination is made, 
 
and the position maintained by the Secretary 
in the case described in subparagraph (A) or 
maintained by the taxpayer in the case 
described in subparagraph (B) is inconsistent 
with the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, 
omission, allowance, disallowance, 
recognition, or nonrecognition, as the case 
may be. 
26 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1).  This condition is the heart of the 
mitigation provisions and serves to limit their application 
mostly to cases in which inconsistent tax treatment results in 
harsh results that cannot be rectified due to the expiration of 
the limitations period.  See O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1041. 
 The Kosses assert that the IRS maintained inconsistent 
positions by arguing in its deficiency assertion, filed in 1980 
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and conclusively determined in 1990, that the basis of the shares 
in 1974 was $110,000 while also accepting the Kosses' 1977 return 
(filed in 1978) which did not declare a loss of the $110,000.  We 
do not view these acts of the IRS as inconsistent.  Although it 
may be true that the Kosses could not have known when filing 
their 1977 return that the shares were originally worth $110,000, 
and that they therefore had lost $110,000 in value, the fact 
remains that they did not declare a loss at all in their 1977 
return.  Consequently, the IRS accepted their 1977 return without 
notice that the shares were worthless.  Surely, the IRS is not 
required to verify the value of the capital assets of all 
taxpayers each year to make sure they have not become worthless. 
Thus, its acceptance of the 1977 return that did not declare such 
a loss, at whatever value, is not inconsistent with its 
successful position in Tax Court that the shares had a basis of 
$110,000 to the Kosses in 1974. 
 The Kosses are correct in arguing that section 
1311(b)(1) does not require the taxpayer to disclose the loss or 
the reason for the nonrecognition of loss in the return for the 
year of the error.  Br. at 14.  This claim, however, is not the 
issue.  The issue is whether the IRS maintained inconsistent 
positions.  The answer is that the IRS could not have maintained 
inconsistent positions because when the Kosses filed their 1977 
return they did not declare that the shares became worthless in 
that year and, thus, they did not put the IRS on notice of that 
fact.  If the shares had not been worthless in 1977, the Kosses 
would not have been allowed to recognize in their 1977 return any 
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loss or gain in value of the shares unless they disposed of them. 
Had they done so, their 1977 return would have been the same as 
the one they actually filed.   
 In sum, the Kosses' claims are barred either by the 
statute of limitations or by their failure to pay the full 
assessed tax, and the mitigation provisions regretfully offer 
them no relief.  These claims were thus not within the district 
court's jurisdiction and were dismissed properly. 
C.  Equitable Recoupment 
 The Kosses also brought a claim for equitable 
recoupment to offset the loss in the value of the shares.  The 
district court concluded that it also did not have jurisdiction 
to entertain the equitable recoupment claim because it did not 
have jurisdiction over the other time-barred claims.  Koss v. 
United States, No. 93-6965, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 
1994).  Under United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608-10, 110 
S.Ct. at 1368-69, equitable recoupment cannot be the sole basis 
of jurisdiction over claims for tax credit or refund.  Thus, a 
court can consider an equitable recoupment claim only if it has 
jurisdiction on other grounds. 
 On appeal, the Kosses argue that although the 1977 tax 
year may be closed irrevocably due to the statute of limitations, 
the 1974 tax year, which was before the Tax Court, remains open 
and thus could be under the jurisdiction of the district court 
for purposes of equitable recoupment.  Br. at 18.  To that end, 
the Kosses state that they are not seeking here "to revive an 
untimely affirmative refund claim," but "to offset a timely claim 
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of the [IRS] for tax assessed" for the year 1974 relating to the 
stock.  Br. at 19.  But, as we discussed above, the Kosses' 
resort to the Tax Court deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction over the 1974 tax year.  Thus, even if the 1974 tax 
year remained open, it would be open only for the Tax Court and 
not for the district court or any other court. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 We cannot close this opinion without making an 
additional observation.  It is, of course, commonplace to note 
that the Internal Revenue Code is remarkably complicated.  In 
this case, these complications have cost the Kosses dearly. 
Indeed, at oral argument we were told that their debt to the IRS 
now exceeds $300,000 because of the inclusion of interest.  Yet 
it is very possible that, but for the operation of the non-
substantive, highly technical procedural provisions that have 
been applied, they would not owe this money.  We are disturbed by 
the harsh result.  Perhaps the Kosses, under the unusually 
oppressive circumstances here, still may obtain administrative 
relief from the IRS, or some other authority.  However, we have 
no alternative and are constrained to affirm the final judgment 
of the district court of December 21, 1994. 
